1.Charge Conference — Initial Review
235 lines(The following proceedings were resumed October 25, 2024, at 8:35 a.m., with appearances as previously noted; stenographically reported by June Bufford.)
THE COURT: Good morning. You-all can be seated.
Madam Clerk, I'm ready.
COURT CLERK: Case No. 2020-CF-2603, State of Florida vs. Sarah Boone.
Appearances from the State?
MR. CACCIATORE: Dave Cacciatore on behalf of the State.
COURT CLERK: Defense?
MR. OWENS: James Owens for Sarah Boone.
MR. HENDERSON: Tony Henderson for Sarah Boone.
COURT CLERK: Ms. Boone, raise your right hand to be sworn, please.
(Defendant sworn.)
SARAH BOONE: I do.
THE COURT: Ma'am, good morning. Can you please state your full name and date of birth for the record for me?
SARAH BOONE: Sarah Boone, 10/10/77.
THE COURT: Ms. Boone is seated at counsel's table wearing a light gray suit and a white blouse. She is in custody, however, will not be wearing any restraints, as such, we will continue to stand when our jury enters and exits.
We're here for a charging conference. The Court has reviewed, I believe, both parties' redlines as to the jury instructions, including, I believe it was submitted last night, the defense's redline as to the jury instructions that were provided by the Court. Let's try to get as much done as we can until our jury arrives.
I believe what we had discussed yesterday was starting at the beginning and moving through as quickly as possible until we get to the real meat of some of the issues in the 3.6(f) and the 3.6(g) instructions.
Mr. Jay?
THE COURT: Yes, sir, you may. Thank you.
I have in my hand a 34-page document that was emailed to the Court last night by counsel for the defense at 12:15 -- 12:06 a.m., from Lauren Henderson. That's what the Court's going to be relying on.
Does everyone have that in front of them?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: In pieces, yes, Judge, I do.
THE COURT: All right. Let's start on page 1 of 34. 3.1, Introduction to Final Instructions.
Any objection to the form of this instruction, State?
MR. JAY: Now I'm confused. I don't know that I have a 34-page document from them last night. There was an attachment -- there was an email at 12:06 --
THE COURT: Hang on.
MR. JAY: -- with three attachments: 3.6(f), separate redlines; 3.6(g), separate redlines; 8.9, culpable negligence redline separate.
THE COURT: Give me a moment.
Then it was what was sent at 11:31 yesterday.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE COURT: I have it as 34.
MR. HENDERSON: Excuse me, Judge.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. HENDERSON: Can I have Ms. Henderson explain how she sent the document?
THE COURT: Fine by me.
MS. HENDERSON: Your Honor, yesterday morning at 11:30, I sent the redline instructions from the defense based off the document you had sent to us yesterday morning. And then last night, we approached and I had asked if that format was okay for you. I believe Mr. Jay had said, could the defense send separate 3.6(f), so it would be easy to incorporate in your final instruction.
THE COURT: And that's what was sent at 12:05 last night?
MS. HENDERSON: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. HENDERSON: Just for more convenience for you.
THE COURT: Understood. Okay. But the balance of the instructions -- because that just addresses those.
MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry. What was the question?
THE COURT: What you just advised only speaks to the 3.6, 3.6(g) instructions.
MS. HENDERSON: And (f), and culpable negligence.
THE COURT: Correct. Okay. All right. So I'm talking about the balance of the instructions that may or may not be at issue.
MS. HENDERSON: Yes, sir. That was -- the balance of the instructions that are not at issue, those are what was sent at 11:30.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. JAY: I have a 31l-page document that was emailed to us by Ms. Henderson at 11:32 in the morning.
THE COURT: Are you looking at October 24 at 11:31 a.m., subject: Defense proposed jury instructions in redline format?
THE COURT: No worries. I'm looking at the email of the correspondence of October 24, 2024, 11:31 a.m., subject: Defense proposed jury instructions in redline format.
Is it possible that you don't have your track -- or your track changes are off and maybe that's why that's the difference?
THE COURT: In Word under review -- or I can just have Madam Clerk print out four copies and we can just work our way through that.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to -- I just forwarded it to Madam Clerk. I'm going to have her print out two copies, that way we've got hard copies so we seem to be all on the same page.
(Pause. )
THE COURT: All right. Both parties have what was provided to the Court yesterday, a 34-page document, which includes the defense's redline with regard to the proposed jury instructions. We'll start on page 1 of 34, instruction 3.1, Introduction to Final Instructions.
Any objection to the form of this instruction, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Moving to page 2 of 34, instruction 3.2, Statement of the Charge, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving to page 3 of 34, 7.1, Introduction to Homicide, those three paragraphs, any objection?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving to the next portion, Justifiable Homicide and the singular paragraph, any objection, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving to Excusable Homicide and the four paragraphs, including paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3, State?
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving to page 4 of 34, 7.4, Second Degree Murder instruction. Defense, any objection to the form of the instruction?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: And also the removal of the lesser included charge on page 5 of 34, correct?
MR. HENDERSON: Correct.
THE COURT: Moving to page 6 of 34, instruction 3.4, When there are Lesser Included Crimes or Attempts. My only question is, if I understand from the defense, they are looking to seek culpable negligence as a --
MR. HENDERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: -- lesser included?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Would that not need to be included here?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So is the only addition to this, the balance of the 3.4 instruction would be correct with the exception of the last sentence, which would read, The lesser crimes, plural, indicated in the definition of second degree murder is manslaughter and followed by culpable negligence?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes. So it should go to R. Yes.
THE COURT: State?
MR. JAY: State objects. There's no evidence to support a misdemeanor culpable negligence lesser included offense for a category two lesser to be included in the jury instructions. Both must be supported by the charging instrument, as well as the evidence in the case. There is no evidence in this case that he only suffered culpable negligence. The crime for culpable negligence with death is manslaughter. Culpable negligence isn't a category one lesser of manslaughter, it's a category two lesser, which includes, by inference, there must be some evidence that her culpable negligence did not result in death.
THE COURT: What's your response to that?
MR. HENDERSON: Judge, the instruction that we're asking for is 8.9. It reads: To prove the crime of culpable negligence, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: One, Sarah Boone exposed Jorge Torres, Jr. to personal injury and; two, she did so through culpable negligence.
As to the fact that there's evidence -- there is evidence of culpable negligence as to the case and the fact that Ms. Boone, while Mr. Torres is still in the Suitcase, goes upstairs.
As to it being charged, it's a category two lesser included that is -- that's available to the defense. The defense can get the category two lesser included offenses as long as there's evidence to support the category two, and there is evidence in this case to support the category two lesser included. That's why we're asking for it.
THE COURT: Any other further argument, Mr. Jay?
THE COURT: All right. At this point in time, the Court is inclined to include the culpable negligence as a lesser included. We'll get to the instruction momentarily.
Any other revisions to the 3.4 instruction, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Moving now to 7.7, manslaughter. There are some objections. The defense is now objecting to paragraph (2) (c), the death of Jorge Torres was caused by the culpable negligence of Sarah Boone.
So how can you ask for a culpable negligence instruction and then object to (2) (c) in the manslaughter instruction? I'm logically having trouble understanding that.
MR. HENDERSON: Just -- this is my argument. Because I'm not arguing that there isn't evidence of it because I just said there's evidence of culpable negligence. The difference is, and I think the burden is different from the State, because it's not alleged in their Information.
THE COURT: But does not the instruction say, Give (2)(a), (2)(b), and/or (2)(c), depending upon allegations and proof?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes. The allegations will be the Information.
THE COURT: Okay. Any response, Mr. Jay?
MR. JAY: Judge, it's a category one lesser. All the theories are included in that, the language does not need to be included in the charging instrument. And, quite frankly, it's not inconsistent with the language in the charging instrument. She's accused of having a depraved mind when killing him, and what the evidence has also shown is that she was heavily intoxicated when she made this decision. That supports a conclusion for a trier of fact to reach that this was done in culpable negligence. And if they reject our argument it was done knowingly and out of hatred, ill will, spite, et cetera.
THE COURT: Any other argument, sir?
MR. HENDERSON: No other argument, Judge.
THE COURT: At this point in time, the Court is going to overrule the defense's objection as to the objection to (2) (c) in the manslaughter instruction, including the final two paragraphs of what the definition of culpable negligence is on the bottom of page 7 of 34.
It seems like it's stipulated between the parties that (2) (b), Sarah Boone intentionally procured an act that caused the death of Jorge Boone -- it should be Jorge Torres -- is not applicable. Is that correct, State?
THE COURT: Is that correct, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
And also since (2) (b) is not applicable, the to procure definition will now be provided.
Any other questions regarding the 7.7 instruction?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
MR. JAY: No objection to what they suggest is the definition of culpable negligence since the Court's going to give it.
THE COURT: With regard to the --
THE COURT: The second lesser. Yeah. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you very much.
What is the instruction number for the culpable negligence instruction? I think it's 8.9, isn't it?
MR. HENDERSON: 8.9.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
Moving now to page 10 of 34, 3.6(d), voluntary intoxication. Does this now need to address culpable negligence or is that only --
MR. JAY: We would request to add the culpable negligence since it's going to be given. So it should read second degree murder, comma, manslaughter, comma, or culpable negligence.
THE COURT: You're talking about the last sentence, correct?
THE COURT: Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to second degree murder, manslaughter, or culpable negligence.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Any objection, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Agree, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Do we want to take an attempt to address the 3.6(f)?
THE COURT: At this time, the Court's just going to make a note that we're going to bypass the 3.6(f) instruction and 3.6(g) instruction.
That will take us all the way to page 23 of 34, instruction 3.7, Plea of Not Guilty; Reasonable Doubt; Burden of Proof. Any objection to the form of this instruction, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving now to page 24 of 34, Weighing the Evidence, 3.9 instruction.
THE COURT: Did I skip it?
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I thought that's what we just covered, Mr. Jay. I apologize.
MR. JAY: I didn't -- I was just making sure that there was no edits that either the Court made or the defense made, so I was just scrolling, but no objection to 3.7.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Moving now to page 24 of 34, 3.9, Weighing the Evidence. Looks like, give as applicable paragraphs Six, seven, nine, and ten have been struck.
Is that acceptable, State?
MR. JAY: Yes, Your Honor. I agree that eight, the inconsistent statement instruction, should get bumped up to six --
THE COURT: Agreed.
THE COURT: With those revisions, is that instruction, 3.9, acceptable to the defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Moving now to page 25 of 34, the latter portion of the 3.9 instruction. Any objection to the language contained on this page, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Moving now -- the 3.9(a) instruction was struck by virtue of Ms. Boone testifying in this matter, so that need not be addressed.
The 3.9(b), Defendant's Statement instruction, also included the requested language by the State. Is there any objection to the form of this instruction at this time, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Boone, earlier this week, and I can't recall if it was yesterday or the day before, the State had filed a motion seeking to add additional language to this instruction, and I had read that language to you at the time. Did you want me to read it again to you this morning?
SARAH BOONE: Yes, please.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to read you the entire 3.9(b) instruction.
3.9(b), Defendant Statements reads: A statement claimed to have been made by the defendant outside of court has been placed before you. Such a statement should always be considered with caution and be weighed with great care to make certain it was freely and voluntarily made. Therefore, you must determine from the evidence that the defendant's alleged statement was knowingly, voluntarily, and freely made.
In making this determination, you should consider the total circumstances including, but not limited to: One, whether when the defendant made the statement, she had been threatened in order to get her to make it and; two, whether anyone had promised her anything in order to get her to make it. That should be revised to the feminine.
Any objection?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That is the form instruction created by the Florida Supreme Court, ma'am.
What has been added is the next paragraph, which reads: Law enforcement is not legally required to ask a suspect whether he or she wants to talk to law enforcement after Miranda warnings are read to a suspect. This is, however, one of the factors you may consider whether the defendant's statements were voluntarily made.
Similar to other conversations we've had this past week, ma'am, I don't want to know specifics about any conversations that you had with you and your attorneys, just simply whether or not those conversations had been had.
Did you and your lawyers discuss the proposed language that I just read to you?
SARAH BOONE: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions with regard to that proposed language?
SARAH BOONE: No.
THE COURT: Are you in agreement with this additional language being added to this defense?
SARAH BOONE: Yes.
THE COURT: Or to this instruction, rather. Thank you.
The last sentence reads: If you conclude the defendant's out-of-court statements -- statement, excuse me, was not freely and voluntarily made, you should disregard it.
Any other clarifications to that instruction, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Judge, in looking at it, it says in the final part, Consider whether the defendant's statements, can we replace and put whether Sarah Boone's statements?
THE COURT: Where are we specifically, sir?
MR. HENDERSON: In the State's special, that I have no objection to. It says this is how -- one of the factors you may consider whether the defendant's statements, if we can have, Sarah Boone's statements, are voluntarily made.
THE COURT: I tend to agree with the State on that.
MR. HENDERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Rule 3.10 -- I'm sorry, instruction 3.10, Rules for Deliberation, page 28 of 34, looks like the parties agree that paragraph seven is not applicable.
MR. HENDERSON: I agree.
THE COURT: That would change paragraph eight to seven.
Any other revisions to 3.10?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: None from the defense.
THE COURT: Moving to 3.11, Cautionary Instruction, defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: The Court then interlineated on page 30, the 2.7, Closing Arguments form instruction. Any objection to that instruction, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Moving now to 3.12, Verdict instruction, page 31 of 34, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: No objection.
THE COURT: Moving now to page 32 of 34, instruction 3.13, Submitting Case to Jury. The only other question I have for the parties is with regard to, I believe it was Exhibit A, the suitcase, are we going to send that back or is that going to be viewable upon writing, similar to the baseball?
THE COURT: Agreed?
MR. HENDERSON: Agree.
THE COURT: All right. Is this instruction acceptable to the State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very good.
And then moving to -- that concludes the -- except for the 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) instruction, that includes the verdict -- or the instructions. I'll have Anita clean that up and send it to the parties so that we have a cleaner redline to work with.
The only question that I think we can address this morning is the verdict form. I received the defense's verdict form and it looks like manslaughter is no longer being sought in the verdict form. Manslaughter was struck out and it was just culpable negligence.
MR. HENDERSON: Under the defense's part, yes.
THE COURT: Right. So how do we want to address the verdict form then? Because if we're giving instructions on manslaughter, it certainly needs to be included in the verdict form.
MR. HENDERSON: I understand, Judge, but the defense isn't requesting manslaughter. But if it's instructed, it has to be in the verdict form.
THE COURT: So the verdict form would read: We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, as charged in the Information. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of culpable negligence. We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty.
Is that acceptable to the State?
THE COURT: Is that acceptable to the defense?
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Similarly, I'll have Ms. Berrios make those revisions and submit them to the parties as soon as possible.
Anything else, State, we need to address before -- Bruce, do we have everybody as of this time?
COURT STAFF: Everybody's here.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Other than the 3.6 instructions and the State's request for other instructions, which I think we'll have to table for now, are we prepared to go ahead and bring in our jury at this time?
MR. JAY: The only thing I wanted to bring to the Court's and the defense's attention was, apparently, yesterday at lunch there was some sort of domestic violence event out in the quad. A co-worker indicated that -- without believing it was any particular jurors in this case, that he did see people with juror badges in and out of the area, so I don't know if that warrants inquiry by anybody.
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. OWENS: I think it should be mentioned.
THE COURT: I agree.
MR. OWENS: Just to see.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. OWENS: We've spent all this time, we've got a bunch of alternates, let's utilize them. But I do have an issue.
THE COURT: Yes, what we got?
MR. OWENS: I think the state attorney in the last piece of evidence is they've extracted from Sarah Boone's phone a bunch of pages of text messages, and I believe their intent is to introduce all those text messages, which are quite a few, but I think they want to read specifically out a few to the jury. My only concern is I don't know which ones they're going to read out. And under the rule of completeness, if there's a thread where it needs to be put in context, we would ask that all of that be read. So I don't know exactly what they're planning.
THE COURT: Mr. Jay, any response?
MR. JAY: It's going back with them. Just like I told them during some of the body-worn cameras, if only some of it's published, it's all going to be there for them to use. I do not intend on reading all 108 pages. I don't intend on trying to delineate contextually one conversation from the other. I think it's just fair to say, this is all going back with you, you're going to have a scrubbed laptop, you can -- you're going to be able to view it all.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Owens, you can make any objections you deem necessary at the time and we'll address it, because it's just hard for me to say what should or should not be -- I understand the State's position, but if it's something that you believe that the rule of completeness should be provided at that time, regardless of it going back, we'll address it.
MR. OWENS: It's going to be about 40 minutes worth of reading text messages. Are you going to have some people come in and read the messages?
MR. JAY: Again, I'm not sure how long it's going to take. I did not practice reading what I'm going to be reading in the mirror.
Number two, no, I don't understand why a witness would be called. It's in evidence. The lawyers can now publish them.
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Owens?
MR. OWENS: Not on that issue. I would like to take about five minutes to use the bathroom.
THE COURT: Sure. We can do that.
Okay. So I don't want to highlight that it was a domestic violence event. So when the parties -- is it acceptable to the parties to inquire if anyone heard or participated, got any information or observed anything of the event that transpired yesterday afternoon in the courtyard. Is that acceptable?
THE COURT: Agreed. Okay. Got a thumbs up from Mr. Owens.
All right. We'll take a ten-minute recess. We'll just plan on being back here at 9:30 and we'll bring the jury in at that time. Thank you-all very much.
(Recess from 9:21 a.m. to 9:36 a.m.)
THE COURT: You-all could be seated. Thank you.
We're on the record in Case No. 2020-CF-2603, State of Florida vs. Sarah Boone.
Let me get appearances for counsel, starting with counsel for the State.
MR. CACCIATORE: Dave Cacciatore on behalf of the State.
MR. OWENS: James Owens for Sarah Boone.
MR. HENDERSON: Tony Henderson for Sarah Boone.
THE COURT: Ms. Boone is still seated counsel's table.
Are we ready to go ahead and bring in our jury at this time, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. OWENS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Let's stand and bring in our jury.
COURT STAFF: Jury is entering.