1.Richardson Hearing
186 lines(The following proceedings were resumed October 18, 2024, at 9:28 a.m., with appearances as previously noted; stenographically reported by Breean Crisp.)
COURT CLERK: This is Case No. 2020-CF-2603, the State of Florida vs. Sarah Boone.
Announce your names for the record, beginning with the State.
MR. CACCIATORE: Dave Cacciatore on behalf of the State.
COURT CLERK: Defense?
MR. OWENS: James Owens on behalf of Sarah Boone.
MR. HENDERSON: Tony Henderson, Sarah Boone.
THE COURT: Ms. Boone, raise your right hand to be sworn, please.
(Defendant sworn.)
SARAH BOONE: I do.
THE COURT: Ma'am, good morning. Can you please state your full name and date of birth for the record for me.
SARAH BOONE: Sarah Boone, 10/10/77.
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Boone is seated at counsels' table wearing a black suit and a pink blouse. She is in custody in this matter, however, there are no restraints that are affixed to her person, so we will be standing when our jury enters and exits.
Before we bring in our jury this morning, yesterday the Court had reserved on a Richardson hearing regarding Exhibit 2 as identified in the Defendant's Fifth Amended Reciprocal Discovery Exhibit List, specifically 119 pages of records from AdventHealth Winter Park that were provided to the State yesterday morning by way of USB drive. Yesterday, the Court had ordered that the defense was to provide an edited version of only the records pertaining to anxiety and the lack thereof or anything pertaining to those matters before 9 a.m. this morning.
Was that done, Mr. Owens?
MR. OWENS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jay, have you had the opportunity to review the culled-down list of 119 documents?
THE COURT: Okay. What is remaining of those 119 specific JPEG images and what do they pertain to?
MR. OWENS: Mr. Beck?
MR. BECK: Your Honor, most of them deal with just billings, observations by the medical personnel and so on that don't necessarily apply to the issue of anxiety, as the Court had indicated. I did include certain pages that discussed depression issues, as I believe that they were related to the anxiety. And then I've identified four or five other pages that are not anxiety related, but may be relevant to the case, and I've described that for the State.
THE COURT: Of those 119 images, how many are being sought?
THE COURT: Fifteen?
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
State, response?
MR. JAY: Apparently, these are all just related to a January 23rd, 2018 admission at AdventHealth Winter Park, so it appears they are not seeking to introduce any records from other instances that were contained in the records that were first disclosed to the State on September 27th.
THE COURT: Do you speak of the 81 pages?
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. JAY: Nor the new 119 pictures that's still not in a PDF form.
So of the 15 pages, the first two that they list are pages 9 and 10 out of 111, and I believe I've identified them as best I can, however, the Bates stamp from the hospital is over other text and there is no other Bates stamp, so I had to -- I'm guessing that it's pages 9 and 10 out of 111. It appears to just be a health information sharing sheet, like, a contract. I don't understand the relevance of those two pages.
Pages 21, and then they skip 22, 23, 24, and 25 are all part of her initial assessment on 1/23/18. We don't object to those pages, but for -- and I apologize that there is a but for -- the fact that at the bottom of page 25 begins her toxicology screening, and that does go into page 26. And they did not indicate that they want to use page 26, however, without page 26, we are going to experience relevancy issues and a 403 objection from the State. And that is because, in her toxicology screen for which she is coming to the treatment -- to seek treatment for depression, depression symptoms, she is at 165 for ethanol. Meaning, when converted, it's .165 grams per deciliter, over twice the legal limit. It's a central nervous system depressant. We are going to have at least one medical doctor -- well, two. The forensic pathologist will testify for the State and then our expert on battered spouse syndrome, if we get to that point, is also a medical doctor. She's a psychiatrist, not a psychologist. Will tell us that ethanol is a central nervous system depressant. I believe even the psychologist will be able to get that information in. So we are objecting to pages 21 through 25 coming in without page 26.
THE COURT: If I understand your argument, is it a rule of completeness issue?
MR. JAY: I mean, in the sense that it applies to documents as opposed to statements. I mean, it is an out-of-court statement, so it is a rule of completeness issue, particularly when the symptoms and the complaints of the patient on that particular day were crying and being depressed and showing signs of uSing a central nervous system depressant.
The rest of the tox screen, pages 27 and 28, they did not list. We are not complaining that they are not including that.
Page 29 is another page they listed. That's more of a narrative about her visit on January 23rd, 2018. We do not object.
Page 43 is just her vital signs. We don't object.
Page 44 is more of the initial assessment on this January 23rd, 2018 visit. We do not object, nor do we object to pages 45, 46, or 47.
THE COURT: What are pages 45, 46, and 47, just for my own edification?
THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.
MR. JAY: Page 48, we are asking, again, that this be included. Again, I don't believe it's super mysterious why we are going from pages 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, and then skipping page 48, and then going to 49, but we do want page 48 included. On that page includes her height and weight at the time.
Page 63 --
THE COURT: What's 49? So seemingly that's included.
MR. JAY: 49 is just some results. Again, it's misleading and doesn't provide full context without what I've described as page 26, because part of the results on page 49 show that she was tested -- shows that she was tested for the presence of ethyl alcohol or ethanol, but it doesn't give the results.
THE COURT: Are the results contained on another page?
THE COURT: So not following 49 to 50 or 51 sequentially?
MR. JAY: No, because -- the pages they want from the 40s are 43 through 47, skipping 48, and we're asking for 48 to be included between 47 and 49 to make sure it's relevant and complete.
THE COURT: But they are also seeking 49, correct?
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JAY: Page 63, it appears to be repetitive, but we don't have any particular objection to page 63 of the 111.
Page 108 seems to be another part of the initial assessment from January 23rd, 2018, so we don't object to that.
So, basically, we're asking for pages 26 and 48 to be included.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
The defense did -- I'm sorry, the State did seek a Richardson hearing yesterday in this matter, and based on binding precedent by the Sixth District Court of Appeal, Young v. State, 369 So.3d 1243, regardless of the culling down of the records, the Court still is required to conduct a Richardson hearing.
As to the issue of whether the defendant's violation was inadvertent or willful, Mr. Owens had advised that these documents were obtained some time last week. He was unable to provide any specificity. He was going to confer with his office.
Mr. Owens or Mr. Beck, are you in a position to advise when these documents were first requested, when they were received, and when they were sent to the State, specifically any documents pertaining to Exhibit 2, the AdventHealth Winter Park records?
MR. OWENS: Judge, yeah. I did check with my secretary, Margaret, and my understanding is -- I didn't know that was going to be a question about when we actually sent it out. I know it was -- one of my trips down here, I got Sarah Boone to sign a medical release. We sent it to the hospital. It took a couple of weeks, I want to say, but we got it last week. We don't know exactly when. We don't timestamp at our office when something is mailed in, and it was mailed in from the hospital to my office.
For whatever reason, the records did not get to Shelbie, who was handling that issue, until late, I think it was yesterday or the day before, that she was aware that they had not been disclosed. We provided the copy to the State at that time.
THE COURT: So did these records come in batches? Because my understanding, based on the State's representation and their objections, was that the first 81 pages came on September 27th, those were provided.
MR. OWENS: Yeah, those were separate. Those were records that some of the other lawyers -- one of the other lawyers had received, and we sent them on, but the problem was, they had notes on them. So we sent that 81, but it wasn't directly from the hospital, so we were trying to get a more complete unedited copy of the records. That's why we made our request.
THE COURT: Okay. And when was the error identified in time as to when these items were not sent, such that they were provided via USB yesterday?
MR. OWENS: Whatever date we gave them is when we realized there was an error. That same day.
THE COURT: My understanding, that would have been yesterday morning?
MR. OWENS: Yes.
THE COURT: Anything else, sir?
MR. BECK: Your Honor, if I may real quickly? Based on the invoice that was sent from the Winter Park Advent's billing department, apparently it's a separate subcontractor, the request was made on the 27th of September. I suspect they waited until they received confirmation of payment of $135 for the receipt of the -- so we received those. So it's all been within a couple of weeks. Plus, we had the hurricane issue last week, and so I think there were issues as to the matters being provided.
I did speak with the State yesterday afternoon, after I had a chance to look at the records, and advised him, essentially, what these matters were in relationship to and was told that they already had those records and were familiar with them. So I don't think that there was any prejudice to the State based upon our submission to the State.
THE COURT: Any further argument or positions with regard to the Richardson analysis, Mr. Jay?
MR. JAY: Yes. For the purposes of this hearing, I'd like this stack of documents marked as Composite A.
THE COURT: Is that the 119 pages, sir?
THE COURT: Any objection?
THE COURT: All right. What was premarked A for purposes of the Richardson hearing will be received without objection as State's l.
(State's Exhibit No. 1 was received in evidence.)
MR. JAY: Your Honor, there was just a reference that these 81 pages were all marked up by the defense. There's no -- there's no markings.
The issue and the confusion that the State Attorney's Office still has, though, is page 68 of 81 of these original 81 documents --
(Brief interruption.)
THE COURT: If you have a cell phone on, they need to be silenced and turned off, please. If you cannot follow the Court's instructions, due to the publicity in this case, I will ask for you to be removed. Does everyone understand?
Thank you.
You may proceed.
MR. JAY: And I realize that I've only had a limited amount of time to review the 119 pages that came in yesterday. And, again, it's more difficult to review those because it's just -- it's not ina PDF where I can word search it and do any of the things that are afforded to us with modern technology. It came in as 119 separate JPEGs. They're not in order, so, for instance, when I am trying to look for page 43 of those 111 records out of 119 pages, it's not in order, and I've done my absolute best to try and see if this page, which is 68 --
THE COURT: Yes.
And referring to 68 of the 81 that was --
THE COURT: -- entered as 1, correct?
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. JAY: And it was sub-labeled within these records as page 2 of 14, and it appears to be a part of her visit on January 23rd, 2018. And in the social history provided, it says, alcohol use, denies. Tobacco use, denies. And the other part isn't relevant. And I just haven't been able to find that and so I'm asking for the leeway to continue to try and search for that particular page out of 119 so that I may ask that, out of the doctrine of completeness and fairness, that it be included. Just at this point I have not been able to find anything in the records that says that, and I'm limited in my abilities to cheat with technology and put it -- you know, if there's a 119-page PDF and you make it word searchable, you just put in the magic word and it helps the attorney greatly. So that's why there's this confusion and that's part of why I had to raise this issue, was just at my first glance of those pages yesterday, I knew that something seemed off compared to what was previously provided.
THE COURT: Okay. Any response?
MR. BECK: It has a heading, Your Honor. I'm not familiar with that heading in the documents that I was reviewing. I'll look for it again and I'll provide any information.
THE COURT: I appreciate you-all working together on that. So here's what we're going to do --
MR. OWENS: Judge, and if I may?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. OWENS: We had told the State that we would bring in a printed copy, not the PDF this morning, but Federal Express, which is the block away, for whatever reason, the road was being constructed, so they closed -- so we were there at 8:00 to get the copy to the State we had promised, but we will bring one at lunch to hand the State.
THE COURT: Okay. Appreciate it.
All right. Any other argument with regard to the Richardson issue?
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Beck?
THE COURT: With regard to -- let me conclude the Richardson analysis first.
All right. Thank you both for your positions and your arguments. The Court has -- as a matter of law, the Court needs to determine whether the defendant's violation was inadvertent or willful. The Court finds that based on the positions provided by the defense, that the disclosure was inadvertent, but I do find that the violation had some level of substantiality to it. But due to the State's review and the defense compliance with the Court's order yesterday as to culling down to the pages that we've identified, the Court finds that the violation had a limited ability on the State's ability to prepare for trial due to the lack of objections to the majority of the documents with the exception of page 48 and 26, which are sought to be included. For those reasons, I find that the prejudicial effect of the substantial disclosure is limited and I'm not going to order the -- I'm not going to prohibit the defense from proceeding forward on moving these items into evidence.
However, I do want to address the 403 rule of completeness issue with regard to paragraph -- or pages, excuse me, 26 and 49 as -- excuse me, 26 and 48 as sought by the State.
No objection, Mr. Beck?
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
So the State's request is granted. Pages 26 and 48 will be included in any evidentiary documents that are sought to be moved into evidence with regard to this January 23, 2018 incident as provided in the 119 pages of item 2 of the Defendant's Fifth Amended Reciprocal Discovery Exhibit list. I will not foreclose the State regarding page 68 of the 81 pages. If they're able to find that additional document, we can -- we can address any argument at that time as to why that should be included.
Anything further, State, before we bring in our jury?
MR. JAY: Judge, the defense team has indicated to me that they intend on using demonstrative aids during opening statement. The ones that I've seen include jury instructions that may not be given and may not be given in the way that the Court gives and photographs that could be coming into evidence. I identified at least one that I don't recognize as something they sought to be seeking into evidence, perhaps two, so I believe we should have a discussion about each and every one of those. They should each be marked for the record purposes by letter so that we can refer to them and we can make a record.
I believe it's in the Court's discretion, even though I rarely see it exercised in this way in this circuit, to allow the respective parties to refer to actual exhibits during opening statements. I would urge the Court not to allow that. They're going to see them soon enough, but particularly with what they are seeking to introduce, given the motion in limine ruling that the Court has already issued that, at this point in time, the latest proffer of the defendant's testimony is not amounting to an overt act that will result in a self-defense instruction that will result in prior instances of violence coming in, that it would be extremely prejudicial, dangerous, and to use Mr. Cacciatore's analogy, very impossible to put that toothpaste back in the tube. If we amplify our opening statements, which may or may not come to fruition when we start talking about these past instances and battered spouse syndrome, it would be greatly amplified if they're actually seeing exhibits of the defendant's past injuries that she's attributing to the decedent. So I'm asking for us to discuss that.
THE COURT: Response before we go through each photo?
MR. OWENS: Judge, yeah, the defense is self-defense. Sarah is going to testify that she was defending herself. We believe the Court is going to rule we're entitled to put on a case involving self-defense. And under the instruction for justifiable use of non-deadly force and the justifiable use of deadly force --
THE COURT: Well, I'm not discussing the jury instructions at this time.
MR. OWENS: All right. But there are evidence of prior threats, of prior events of violence coming in under that instruction. Under the self-defense -- justifiable use of non-deadly force --
THE COURT: Here's my concern. Why are we addressing law in opening statement?
MR. OWENS: Well, I agree with the state attorney. I did blow up a couple of these on the justifiable use of non-deadly force, and I would agree --
THE COURT: Still, that does not answer my question.
MR. OWENS: I would agree not to -- not to use those.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. OWENS: The two I'm interested in using in opening is this standard instruction: It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable. You should use your common sense in deciding which is the best evidence and which evidence should not be relied upon in considering your verdict.
Do you want me to read it out?
THE COURT: No. I can see it, sir.
MR. OWENS: Okay. And then the other one is, A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, speculative, imaginary, or forced doubt. It's the standard instruction on reasonable doubt.
THE COURT: What's your position with regard to those two, Mr. Jay?
MR. JAY: Judge, it's opening statements. We should we discussing what we anticipate to come into the trial, and that's going to be enough of a minefield. It really shouldn't be about the law. We'll both have an opportunity to use the actual jury instructions, which we have not decided upon. We will have the opportunity to use that overhead or any means that we want at the end of the trial during our closings to put up what is actually decided to be the law after the case has been presented.
So it's our position that we shouldn't be using demonstrative aids with portions of jury instructions. We're going to have that opportunity to argue how the law applies to the facts at the end, and we will have the correct version. And if the Court is following the tendency that I've seen in this circuit recently, we may, in fact, reed three-quarters of the jury instructions to them before we even begin our closing remarks. I think it's premature and problematic to be doing that at this time and it's not the role of opening remarks.
THE COURT: Any other response?
MR. OWENS: Judge, I've been doing this 35 years. I've had these boards -- I've used these boards in opening statements I don't know how many times. I've said that I would waive introducing the one specific to self-defense, but reasonable doubt is an instruction you gave to the jury when we got started and then this weighing the evidence is a standard jury instruction that applies in every case.
THE COURT: Are those the standard -- is that the language of the standard instruction?
MR. JAY: I have not had the opportunity this morning to pull up the Florida Standard Criminal Jury Instructions off the Supreme Court website due to dealing with motions in limine, trying to prepare my opening statement, and doing all of the things that I should be doing on the eve of openings, but I did notice that I did not believe the reasonable doubt instruction was complete, just from memory, and I know that's not the complete weighing the evidence instruction either. It's an entire page of instructions for each of those.
THE COURT: Can I see the reasonable doubt instruction, please?
Well, here's the first problem, that's the wrong instruction. The Florida Supreme Court revised 3.7 earlier this year. That is not the appropriate definition of reasonable doubt. It is not what was read to the jury during jury selection.
3.7 now reads: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible, a speculative, imaginary, or forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you to return a verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt. On the other hand, if after carefully considering, comparing, and weighing all the evidence, there is not an abiding conviction of guilt, or if having a conviction, it is one which is not stable, but one which wavers and vacillates, then the charge is not proved beyond every reasonable doubt and you must find the defendant not guilty because the doubt is reasonable.
That does not track the standard jury instruction. For those reasons, I'm not going to allow it.
MR. OWENS: Judge, I'll have it redone for closing arguments.
THE COURT: As long as it -- I mean, we're still in the process of working through. The 3.7 instruction speaks for itself. I won't preclude you from using enlargements in closing, but for the purposes of opening, because it doesn't track the 3.7 instruction, I'm not going to allow it.
MR. OWENS: And this is an excerpt from the weighing the evidence.
THE COURT: That seems to be the standard 3.9 instruction, or at least portions of it. Response?
MR. JAY: Again, since it's not all of it, it's misleading. It's highlighting something about the law when we're just talking about open remarks -- opening remarks. Six through ten are optional. We haven't decided which out of the optional instructions, six through ten, we're going to use in this case because we have not heard the evidence yet.
So I just think it's inappropriate to be delving into pieces and portions of jury instructions before we get the evidence. What we should be doing is explaining to the jury what we believe the facts are going to show and the inferences that they can draw from them and argue the law later.
THE COURT: Last bite at the apple, sir.
MR. OWENS: Well, Judge, they've got to have some guidance to the law. You know, in many ways, we do it where we give them the law at the very end, you know, and I understand the reason for that, depending on the evidence that comes in, but there's standard instructions that are going to apply throughout, and this is just giving them an idea of what their role is in considering the credibility of witnesses. I think it's appropriate. It's a brief statement of a standard instruction that comes in on every case.
THE COURT: Let me move to the photographs before I address the 3.9 issue.
THE COURT: Okay. You want them marked by Madam Clerk, correct?
THE COURT: Okay. So let's approach with that first photograph, please.
MR. OWENS: Should I?
THE COURT: Madam Clerk, yes.
MR. OWENS: Thank you.
COURT CLERK: A through J.
MR. OWENS: All right. Judge, this is -- for the record, this is identified as A -- Defendant's Exhibit A for purposes of a demonstrative aid in opening statement. It's a picture of Sarah Boone that was taken by law enforcement on one of the incidents involving his arrest. And as you can see, there's blood on her ear, which we believe is relevant and admissible.
THE COURT: Okay. Next photo.
MR. OWENS: This is B -- is that a B?
COURT CLERK: That is a B.
MR. OWENS: This is Defense Exhibit B, which is a picture of Sarah Boone on the back porch of the townhouse in question with her two dogs.
Defense Exhibit C is a blowup of the picture of inside the townhouse, showing the sliding glass door, as well as the staircase that leads to the master bedroom and the bookshelf.
Defense Exhibit D is a picture of the large screen TV with six or seven holes in it from where Jorge Torres hit the TV with a bat, threatening Sarah Boone.
Defense Exhibit E is a blowup of injuries to Sarah Boone's left arm from Jorge Torres.
Defense Exhibit F is a closeup of the wound to Sarah Boone's leg where Jorge Torres stabbed her with a steak knife.
Defense Exhibit G is a closeup of Sarah Boone's face that shows where Jorge Torres poked her with a curtain rod.
Defense Exhibit H is a photograph, a closeup of Sarah Boone after she was kicked in the head by Jorge Torres.
Defense Exhibit I is another closeup of Sarah Boone's face after she suffered injury at the hands of Jorge Torres.
All these -- I believe, Judge, all these exhibits, except for the first one, A, were in Sarah Boone's phone. The State took custody of the phone. The State had the photographs. The State provided the defense in discovery with these photographs.
We intend on introducing these photographs. We don't intend on introducing the blowups. We intend on introducing the normal size pages of the photographs and then using these as a demonstrative aid to show the jury here in opening and then in closing the injuries that Sarah Boone sustained at the hands of Jorge Torres.
THE COURT: Any other further argument with regard to the use of those items premarked as A through I in opening statement, Mr. Owens?
MR. OWENS: Yes, sir, Judge. And I sent you some case law. I don't know if you got that.
THE COURT: When did you send it, sir?
MR. OWENS: This morning.
COURT CLERK: Hold on one second. Is this the e-mail that you guys sent me?
MR. OWENS: Yes.
THE COURT: I have not received it.
MR. OWENS: I think, Judge, you were already on the bench, so we sent it to the clerk and your JA.
THE COURT: Has State seen a copy of it?
MR. JAY: I'm familiar with the case law. I did receive the e-mail. I'm not sure if it indicated who all was copied on it or if it was a separate one, but I'll check.
THE COURT: I've been provided Alcegaire v. State, 326 So.3d 656, Florida Supreme Court, 2021; Lowe v. State, 259 So.3d 23, Florida Supreme Court, 2018.
Yes, sir?
MR. OWENS: Judge, the Court has discretion to allow demonstrative aids. If you'll look at one or both of those, there was a -- the State wanted to introduce a dummy they were using in a homicide case, which the Court allowed. The other cases have allowed photographs and demonstrative aids to be used in opening statements.
In the Alcegaire case, which is the 2021 case, The Supreme Court -- the trial court acted within its discretion in preventing the State's use of a map as demonstrative aid during the guilt phase rebuttal closing argument in a capital murder trial where evidence visually demonstrated on the map was not without support in the record. That was actually an exhibit that wasn't in the record.
The 2018 case, Supreme Court of Florida, again, the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing a demonstrative exhibit in that case. It was a murder prosecution. The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State to use a mannequin as a demonstrative aid in order to show the position of the gun in relation to the victim's body. The mannequin was used to set out the circumstances of the crime and to attempt to establish aggravation. The mannequin was used to demonstrate the location of the gunshot wounds, the angle of the impact against the skin, the incapacitating nature of each gunshot wound; advising the trajectories were anatomical, not spatial, and had a small degree of error. There only was slight difference between the victim's size and the mannequin's dimensions. There was nothing to suggest the mannequin was altered to resemble the victim.
The Court allowed. Again, the Court's discretion.
As you know, we're claiming self-defense, and as part of that instruction, we're entitled to allege prior instances of difficulties and prior acts of violence so that the defendant who asserts self-defense -- their state of mind is different from the norm.
I think the two instructions would read: If you find that Sarah Boone who, because of prior threats or difficulties with Jorge Torres, had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in danger of imminent use of unlawful force at the hands of Jorge Torres, you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of Sarah Boone were those of a reasonable person.
It goes on to say: If you find at the time of the alleged second degree murder Sarah Boone knew that Jorge Torres had committed an act or acts of violence, you may consider that fact in determining whether Sarah Boone reasonably believed it was necessary for her to use non-deadly force.
We have a good faith belief that the exhibits will be introduced into evidence. They're demonstrative aids to aid the jury in understanding the circumstances surrounding that relationship and the actions that Sarah took and the reasonableness of those actions in light of their history.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Any response, State?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. JAY: Judge, the standard is, it is your discretion, and you will only be reversed if you abuse your discretion in this regard. The State is urging you, just flat-out as a matter of principle, to not allow the parties to go into the exhibits during opening statements.
They're going to be seeing the actual exhibit s in the very, very near future. I mean, we can do this. We can play the videos, we can show gruesome autopsy photographs on the big screen as well during opening statements, but those things are all coming. So we're just asking you first, in general, let's not extend the opening statements in that regard any more than necessary.
Now, our specific objections are this: With A, which is beneath everything now, but the bloody ear from the prior incident, I believe that is from a body-worn camera, and I think he indicated as much, it was not from her phone. If we get to that point where we know that this piece of evidence is coming in, that would be one thing, but right now the law of the case is, they cannot put on any evidence of prior instances of violence, any reputation evidence regarding the victim, or go into battered spouse syndrome in the evidence until self-defense has been established. And that self-defense must be established by the testimony -- and in this particular case, it has to come from the defendant -- of an overt act taken by the decedent which resulted in imminent threat of great bodily harm or death. And we have had that litigation. We have provided the Court the most recent testimony regarding the defendant's most recent statements from the two doctors and it doesn't exist at this time.
So it's one thing for the parties to go into things in opening statements that don't end up coming into evidence. And when the defendant does that, well, under King vs. State, the State gets to point out, Look, they made these promises in opening statements and they didn't come to fruition, so you need to disregard everything that you heard that was going to happen in trial that didn't.
But the problem, particularly for the State side, is we don't get to appeal. So if we go through opening statements and we have the jurors not only exposed to our words about things that may or may not be coming into evidence, but exposed to 1,000 words per picture, if a picture is worth 1,000 words, that amplifies the error, and it's an error the State has no remedy to fix.
So we're asking for A, which would absolutely come into evidence -- if we get this overt act testimony, which has not occurred yet, from the defendant, then certainly A would come in, and some of the other letters. And there's nothing wrong with him blowing it up like that. In fact, the State has it on their exhibit and will be showing it on the screen as well. There's not, you know, a lot of dispute over whether that will come in if we meet that standard of an imminent act -- or an overt threat of an imminent act of danger.
B, I'm not sure B was on their list of items that they sought to introduce from the phone. We would argue a picture of her with her dogs on her porch doesn't have any relevance. I don't expect that to be coming into trial, so we're objecting on that separate ground.
And then returning back to C, D, E, F, G, H, I, State is all aware of those photographs. We are prepared to introduce them ourselves through the digital evidence, there's no hiding those things, if we meet the threshold for this sort of evidence coming in.
THE COURT: Could you identify those for me? I'm trying to keep notes contemporaneously.
THE COURT: It was C through I inclusive?
MR. JAY: Yes. Bis the only one that is not a photograph of prior violence. It's -- I don't know. It wasn't on their list of things that they sought to introduce and I don't know what the relevance would be of her just sitting there on her porch with her dogs. But A and then C through I, Judge, absolutely, at the end of the trial, great, blow them up, use them as much as you want. But in this particular case, with the rulings that the Court has already made about this based on the State's motion in limine, it is very dangerous to allow them to do this when we are not expecting it to be admitted into evidence based on the current state of the defendant's testimony.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Owens, if you could address Exhibit B, what was premarked as B.
MR. OWENS: But, Judge, you've already ruled that these things come in. Remember that prior ruling?
THE COURT: No. What I ruled was, is that you're able to discuss them and address them in opening. Photographs are a totally different kitty.
MR. OWENS: JI said nothing about battered spouse syndrome. I said self-defense. These exhibits come in under self-defense. In arguing these, I've said nothing about battered spouse. I'm talking about self-defense.
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. OWENS: And prior difficulties, prior acts of violence is a standard instruction --
THE COURT: But the overt act requirement remains. I mean, we've reviewed Holland and read it multiple times.
MR. OWENS: And in good faith, with discussions with my client, we believe there's going to be evidence of an overt act, that she was facing imminent threat, and she reacted based on that threat.
THE COURT: Understood. Your response to Exhibit B?
MR. OWENS: Let me look at B. Which one is B?
THE COURT: It's her on the back porch with the two dogs.
MR. OWENS: Judge, not only did he abuse -- Jorge Torres abuse --
THE COURT: That's not the issue. The issue is that the State represented that it was not part of your exhibit list.
MR. OWENS: I believe it is a part of the exhibit list. We got this from the State. This was a -- they sent over a bunch of pictures of flowers or paintings that they wanted to introduce that they listed as exhibits. I thought for sure we put this on there, but the relevance of it is, not only did he abuse Sarah Boone, Jorge Torres, he abused the dogs and he would threaten to abuse the dogs to control Sarah Boone.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. OWENS: They're checking, Judge --
THE COURT: All right.
MR. OWENS: -- on whether they have it on the list or whether --
THE COURT: The Court is prepared to rule at this point in time. Thank you both for your presentations and your argument.
The Court has had the opportunity to [sic] what was premarked as A through I inclusive. First, with regard to the portion of the 3.9 instruction, the purposes of opening statement is to set the table of what the issues are, what the parties believe the facts and evidence will show. It is not a proper time to be discussing law or elements of law, and that is an element of law that will be instructed to the jury at the end of the case. So the Court is going to exercise its discretion for those reasons and prohibit you from using the portion of the 3.9 instruction in opening statement. You can talk about, This is a job that you're going to have, but I'm not going to allow you to read portions of the instruction for those reasons at this time.
With regard to what was premarked as A through I, the Holland case is clear, Before a defendant may introduce evidence of the victim's character, he must first show that there was an overt act by the victim at or about the time of the incident that reasonably indicated a need for self-defense.
I understand your good faith belief. I take no position on whether or not you're going to make it or not. That's something that you're going to have to establish, but the concern is that the photographs, some of them are graphic in nature -- the lacerations, the sutures, the bruising, facial wounds with bleeding -- may have such an impact such that the toothpaste cannot be placed back into the tube, assuming that overt act hurdle is not met. The Court, again, takes no position on whether or not you're going to be able to meet it because I haven't heard the evidence and testimony. So the Court is going to exercise its discretion for those reasons.
You can talk about it. You can talk about it, that she was a victim. You can talk about some incidences may have happened, but I'm not going to allow the photographs at this point in time for those reasons, for your utilization of them in opening statements.
Any questions or clarifications with regards to the Court's ruling, State?
THE COURT: Defense?
MR. OWENS: No, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Are we prepared to bring in our jury at this time?
MR. OWENS: I've got two other issues.
THE COURT: They've been waiting for an hour and 20 minutes, Counselor.
MR. OWENS: I understand.
We intend to play the two-minute suitcase video to the jury in opening statement.
THE COURT: State?
MR. JAY: Again, I'm asking you to urge your discretion. They're going to hear it in the next two days of court. It's within your discretion whether we're going to start using exhibits during opening statement.
THE COURT: What's the other issue, sir?
MR. OWENS: I need to approach the bench on the other one.
THE COURT: Okay. With regard to the video, I'm not going to allow proposed exhibits to be used in opening statements. What's good for the goose is good for the gander. If I'm not going to allow your photographs, I'm not going to allow the State to do anything. You can orally talk about what you believe the evidence and testimony is going to show, but the actual evidence is going to have to be presented here through witnesses or through a demonstration and publication after that evidence is admitted.
You-all can approach.
THE COURT: Please. I would appreciate it. Thank you.