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2024 Criminal TrialtranscripttranscriptPending Motions Hearing - Day 3: Jury Selection - 2024 Criminal TrialThe court conditionally allowed battered spouse syndrome evidence, granted interview redactions, and limited medical-record evidence on Day 3. Exhibit objections remained unresolved as preparations for jury selection continued.
William R. JayDave Cacciatore, Jr.Kevin Timothy BeckTony HendersonJames Sylivan OwensSarah BooneMichael KraynickCourt ClerkMR. CACCIATOREMR. JAYMR. OWENSMR. HENDERSONSarah BooneTHE COURTMR. BECKprocedural
5 pages·0 witnesses·1,962 lines
The court set conditions for battered spouse syndrome evidence, ordered interview redactions, and ruled on medical and digital exhibits while preserving trial objections. Jury selection continued with questions about impartiality, witness credibility, abuse, and self-defense, alongside stipulated juror excusals and concerns requiring further inquiry.
ProceduralProc.Sarah Boone's Oath and Identification

(The following proceedings were resumed October 16, 2024, at 10:10 a.m., with appearances as previously noted; stenographically reported by Breean Crisp.)

COURT CLERK: This is Case No. 2020-CF-2603, the State of Florida vs. Sarah Boone.

State?

MR. CACCIATORE: Dave Cacciatore on behalf of the State.

MR. JAY: William Jay for the State.

COURT CLERK: Defense?

MR. OWENS: James Owens on behalf of Sarah Boone.

MR. HENDERSON: Tony Henderson on behalf of Sarah Boone.

COURT CLERK: Ms. Boone, raise your right hand to be sworn, please.

(Defendant sworn.)

COURT CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ma'am, good morning. Can you state your full name and date of birth for the record for me?

SARAH BOONE: Sarah Boone, 10/10/77.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Boone is seated at counsels' table wearing a gray suit and a white blouse. She is out of custody and unshackled.

Mr. Beck, you arrived late, sir. Can I get your appearance for the record, please?

ProceduralProc.Rulings on Battered Spouse Evidence, Interview Redactions, and Medical Records

MR. BECK: Yes, Your Honor. Kevin Beck on behalf of Sarah Boone.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. We're here on a litany of different matters, multiple motions in limine; the State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Battered Spouse Syndrome Evidence or Exclude Mention of Battered Spouse Syndrome Evidence Until the Defendant Testifies to a Justifiable Use of Deadly Force filed October 6, Defendant's Response to State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Battered Spouse Syndrome Evidence or Mention of Battered Spouse Syndrome Evidence Until Defendant Testifies filed October 15th, and then the Defendant's Amended Response to same, also filed October 15th, the Defendant's Motion in Limine filed October 6th, the State's response to same filed October 6th, State's Objection and Motion in Limine to Exclude Decedent's Medical Records filed October 14th, and then the parties' objections with regard to specific exhibits that may be sought to be entered at trial. The Court has reviewed everything and reviewed all of your case law and we're ready to proceed.

I believe we should probably proceed first on the battered spouse motions first. So, State, you may begin.

And I also have reviewed as well the excerpts of the deposition of both Dr. Werner and Dr. Harper as identified in the State's motion.

MR. JAY: Your Honor, for the record, I'm having Madam Clerk mark A, B, and C for identification purposes for this hearing.

A is a copy of the defendant's statements that she made on body-worn camera to Deputy Sheriff Kayla Rodriguez on February 24th, 2020, as well as the interview that she provided to Detectives Koepsell and Lowen on February 24th, 2020 and February 25th of 2020. It is an identical exhibit as to what was provided to the Court for review in chambers as a courtesy before the motion to suppress statements, as well as what is entered into evidence for that motion to suppress statements hearing that was held.

State would move A for identification purposes in as 1 for the purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: Response as to what was premarked as A?

MR. HENDERSON: No objection.

THE COURT: All right. What was premarked as State's A will be received without objection as State's 1.

(State's Exhibit No. 1 was received in evidence.)

MR. JAY: B for identification for purposes of this hearing is the deposition of Dr. Harper. We would move that into evidence as State's 2 for the purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HENDERSON: No objection.

THE COURT: All right. What was premarked as B will be received without objection as State's 2.

(State's Exhibit No. 2 was received in evidence.)

MR. JAY: C for identification for the purposes of this hearing is the deposition of Dr. Werner. State would move that into evidence as State's 3 for the purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HENDERSON: No objection.

THE COURT: All right. What was premarked as State's C will be received without objection as State's 3.

(State's Exhibit No. 3 was received in evidence.)

MR. JAY: So Your Honor is familiar with all those exhibits and has been able to review them prior to the hearing, so I will just proceed to legal argument.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MR. JAY: Your Honor, this is a motion in limine. We are asking for a pretrial ruling based on the proffered statements that the defendant has made, which should -- in good faith and reliance, the State should be able to assume that that will be her testimony at trial, given that her latest version of events was just given to our expert last week.

So we are asking for a pretrial ruling on, if that is the evidence that comes in at trial, will she get a self-defense instruction? Will she be able to then open the door to all the things that come with self-defense, such as reputation evidence of the victim for being violent, which she may or may not be aware of that is not required under the law, or prior instances of violence between she and the victim or the victim and anybody that she is aware of, because that goes to the reasonableness of her perception of an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.

We are not asking to not be allowed to talk about these things during voir dire. The defense cited numerous cases and spent some of their time in their response about the ability to voir dire that. That was not the purpose of our motion, and I don't think we mentioned voir dire, because we understand that the defendant can, like any other witness, change her story again. So we understand that we both, on both sides -- and we intend on spending a great deal of time on it as well for the State of Florida. We need to explore these issues during jury selection.

But what we are asking from the Court now preliminarily is, if that is what the defendant is going to say in trial -- and I'm not asking the Court to make any credibility determinations about one version or another. We're asking you to treat this just like a (c) (4) motion or a motion for summary judgment ina civil case. If this is what she says, does this amount to what they are asking for legally? And it's the State's position under the case law, that no.

Because under her statements that she gave to the experts, there was no overt act taken by the decedent on that day. There was no overt action, and that's what's required under the law to trigger her response of acting in self-defense. There was nothing creating an imminent fear of death or great bodily harm to her until she committed two forcible felonies and a non-forcible felony.

What her testimony was, is we were having a good day. Now, what's different -- and, again, we don't -- we're not asking you to make a credibility determination about what's different, but what is different than what you had heard at the motion to suppress is, We were having a good day, but I'm on edge every day because of past instances of violence, including an instance the night before, but we were having a good day. We're out on the porch. There's a dart board out there. There's puzzles that we're doing. We're doing arts and crafts. We're doing everything to keep him preoccupied so he doesn't get sad or upset. Interjecting with some phone calls to his family, which she knows would potentially upset him, but that's her testimony.

And then eventually it comes to a point in time where they're sitting on the couch and he reaches over to her and says, Tag, you're it. And she apparently runs up to the shower to hide and he apparently gets into the suitcase to hide, and it's not clear who's it. Eventually she comes down out of the shower after she says she was getting cold up there and sees him in the Suitcase and zips him up. And at the time that she Zips the suitcase, what she describes is nearly entirely shut, but two fingertips could get out. Mind you, a 103-pound man, two fingertips. They're laughing. It's all fun and games still. There's still no overt act taken by the decedent during this entire calendar day to put anybody in reasonable fear -- objectively reasonable fear of imminent harm, of great bodily harm or death.

And it's only when he begins to say, after she has zipped him up into the suitcase -- and, again, she's saying that she did not have mal intent at that time. When he starts to say, I cannot breathe, now she describes to the doctors that she does have bad intent and she wants him to feel what she has felt in the past. She gets angry is her description. She shakes the suitcase. She beats it. It falls over. It flips over. And he sticks his fingertips out, she hits him with a bat. So she's now the initial aggressor. And we'll discuss jury instructions as we get closer, but she's the initial aggressor, and she has now committed forcible felonies; aggravated assault and aggravated battery.

Stating that, I only intended to keep him in there for a couple of minutes, I believed he could get out. She never perceived, according to her, that he would die or face great bodily harm. And she just goes upstairs knowing now he's mad because she won't let him out, now because of the actions she took as the initial aggressor, she is facing death or great bodily harm from the decedent if he gets out. And she completely expects him to get out because her testimony is that he could get two fingertips out of the zipper.

So, Your Honor, under the law, the State understands -- we are deeply, deeply thoughtful about this request because of the risk of error, but this is just one of those cases, like the cases the State cited, there is no self-defense if that is what her testimony is. And, therefore, the jury should not hear about any prior instances of violence, any reputation evidence, any battered spouse syndrome unless and until there is testimony that is self-defense that's recognized under the State of Florida's laws.

So what we are asking for is a ruling that if -- and this is a motion in limine, and a motion in limine is, Hey, this is what's proffered to the Court prior to trial; if this is what comes in at trial, this is the Court's preliminary ruling, unless something changes. What we are asking for is a preliminary ruling that, if that is what her testimony is, then we should not be allowing introduction of past instances of violence, reputation for violence --

(Brief interruption.)

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. JAY: -- or battered spouse syndrome evidence.

And, furthermore, what the case law supports is our request that, clearly, this evidence can only come from her. There was nobody else in the apartment -- or townhouse that night, so she should have to testify before any of those things come in, and she -- her testimony should meet the requirements of an overt act before any of this testimony comes in. It should not be allowed to come in prior to her testimony.

And under the case law that the State cited, it's not unfair, it's not forcing her to testify. She chose to raise battered spouse syndrome. The State completely understands we have the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, but what the case law says is, we shouldn't have to combat this. We can't put the toothpaste back in the tube until she actually puts forth the self-defense that justifies all this.

So that is our request. We are not making any requests about voir dire because, we understand, she can come in and testify differently yet again at trial, and that's a discussion we'll have to have as well about how that will occur. The State's position is, is that if she changes her testimony yet again, she should have to give a narrative testimony. No attorney should be allowed to participate in putting forth new testimony about the events of February 23rd.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Response?

MR. HENDERSON: Good morning, Judge.

THE COURT: Good morning, sir.

MR. HENDERSON: I'm a little confused, but I want to make sure, so probably can save some time here. My understanding is what the State is saying at this time, that there's no objection to raising this in voir dire to see how the jury would react or their feelings about it. So that's not it.

So what that leaves me is, I guess the State is trying to say there should be no mention of battered spouse or anything like that in opening statement?

THE COURT: That wasn't my takeaway either. My takeaway from the motion and the State's argument today is, from an evidence perspective, concepts or testimony or even opinion evidence about battered spouse syndrome cannot be raised, including any of the reputation or specific instances of conduct that are contemplated by self-defense, until there's a factual basis for it.

My understanding of the defense's doctor, Dr. Harper's deposition, was that the basis of her opinion -- and please correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is that the basis of Dr. Harper's deposition is based on her four or five interviews or sessions with Ms. Boone as to what transpired on the day and night in question. Is that accurate?

MR. HENDERSON: I need to confer.

(Pause. )

MR. HENDERSON: Judge, if I could have you repeat that question for me?

THE COURT: Sure.

So my understanding -- well, let me ask you -- I'll ask more of an open-ended question. What is the basis factually of Dr. Harper's opinion?

So if we were at trial right now, for the purposes of this exercise, and you were going to call Dr. Harper to testify, what is the factual basis component under 90.702 in order to get her to testify? We're not dealing with her CV and her credentials. I'm not sure the State is going to have any position with regard to those, but let's just assume the State has no objection with regard to her credentials and that she is, in fact, an expert based on her knowledge, training, and experience in her field, what is step one under 90.702 to allow her to testify? What is the sufficient factual basis of her opinion?

MR. HENDERSON: Judge, I think her opinion would be based on several different things. Mainly, one of the things that her opinion would be based on is her interaction over the course of time with our client, Ms. Boone. That's one.

But Dr. Harper has also reviewed other evidence in this case that helps her form the basis of her opinion and also her knowledge of battered spouse syndrome. That has to be taken into account because, quite frankly, Judge, people who suffer for things -- from certain things, they don't know. That's why you have to -- like if you have to get an expert opinion as to someone's mental health situation. I mean, a person doesn't really know that they're suffering from a mental health problem. They have no idea ina lot of circumstances.

What they do is they get evaluated by a doctor, the doctor has experience of what signs to look for in these things, and getting those signs with what they told outside sources too, they are able to make a determination based on their training and experience, SO...

THE COURT: But based on the Oquendo case, which is cited by the State as to what battered spouse is, is it's an ambit of the self-defense. So under the statute, are you traveling under 776.012 as your basis for self-defense?

MR. HENDERSON: Yes, but this is -- this is the problem that I'm having here. Self-defense is a defense -- it's an affirmative defense that's available to anybody. It's based on the evidence at trial.

THE COURT: But what's the overt act? Because in reviewing Dr. Harper's deposition, there were specific questions by the State inquired of her about the language specifically in the statute, it's about the imminence of fear, and she was unable to answer those questions.

So my question really is, what's the overt act by the victim which would have given rise to self-defense? Because the case law -- taking aside the State's case law under the stand your ground concepts, which I find distinguishable, because under 776.032, there's a specific statutory scheme for pretrial stand your ground motions, so I find those cases distinguishable for that very reason.

THE COURT: But there's specific case law -- there's specific case law that talks about in the self-defense realm that the State has cited to in their motion that an overt act is needed. What is the overt act?

MR. HENDERSON: Judge, the overt act has to come from testimony, and I agree in this case, but --

THE COURT: What is it?

MR. HENDERSON: -- that has to be the testimony of Sarah Boone for that overt act, and that testimony can only take place at trial. In making a determination of whether to give the self-defense instruction, it has to be based on the evidence presented at trial.

THE COURT: I agree with you on that. I completely agree with you on that. And the case law is clear that even if there's a scintilla of evidence, I have to give that instruction.

THE COURT: But we're not dealing with the jury instruction right now. What I'm dealing with right now is pretrial, the State is saying you cannot proceed on battered spouse -- there's two avenues in this motion. Avenue one is you cannot proceed with battered spouse because of the factual reasons based on Dr. Harper's deposition as to what she's going to -- be the basis of her opinion, battered spouse cannot be entered. Alternatively, you cannot talk about it until there's foundation. That's my takeaway from the State's argument; that before battered spouse is argued or provided or an opinion, there has to be that foundation to it.

And the linchpin for me is the overt act issue; that how can we have anybody testify to opinions or any of the reputation or specific instances of conduct that we prevented until that overt act is established? What's your response to that?

MR. HENDERSON: My response to that, if I'm understanding you correctly, because --

THE COURT: And if you need to reframe the question, please.

MR. HENDERSON: No, because it's procedurally. There's no way that we could come in here and put Dr. Harper on the stand before Sarah Boone. It just doesn't work. Because to even establish the relevancy of Dr. Harper's testimony, Sarah Boone, who was the only witness there at the time -- I agree with that with the State -- has to present evidence of self-defense; has to present the evidence of the Court talking about that overt act.

It's not based on what the doctor perceives or what the doctor was told by Ms. Boone or what questions -- what questions were asked at that deposition? I don't know. Mr. Owens took the deposition. The questions, though, at the depositions are limited and the doctor answers, but that's not what this has to be based on. What it has to be based on is, what does Ms. Boone in this case testify to on the stand? And if any of that -- excuse me. If any of that presents a scintilla of evidence to award the self-defense instruction, then the self-defense instruction should be given. That's the first step.

Everything follows after that, Judge, because this isn't -- this isn't a situation where I think it's appropriate to make a pretrial ruling, because a ruling has to be based on the evidence that comes from that witness stand. Now, any of the evidence is subject to cross-examination, impeachment, anything like that, but that's the weight for the jury to determine. But as to the admissibility of the evidence, it has to start with Sarah Boone. A judgment can't be made -- or a decision cannot be made until the testimony of Sarah Boone takes place at trial. This is just procedurally incorrect.

THE COURT: Any other argument, sir?

MR. HENDERSON: No other argument.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Rebuttal?

MR. JAY: Yes, sir.

This is procedurally correct. Parties are allowed to get motions in limine based on the proffers of evidence that have been made prior to trial. Apparently, opposing counsel has not read the depositions or -- he clearly didn't attend them because he was not there, but the Court has before it the statements that Sarah Boone made when directly asked, What happened that day? What happened next? And there was no overt act taken by the decedent on that particular day.

What they want to do and what is not permissible under the case law that I have cited -- in particular, the one that says, you get a threatening text and then two days later you can't go slit somebody's throat because of the threatening text two days earlier. Not to dehumanize Mr. Torres at all, but to give you this analogy, if somebody owns a bad dog and that bad dog bites, and that bad dog has bitten in the past, but on this particular day the dog is just doing arts and crafts and puzzles and hanging out, drinking some Woodbridge Chardonnay and you put the dog in the Suitcase and then the dog barks because it's in the Suitcase and doesn't want to be in the suitcase when it's zipped up, that triggers you to, I remember when the dog bit me in the past.

You can't -- that's not how this works. That's not how self-defense works, with or without battered spouse syndrome. There has to be an overt act. You can't bootstrap and make up a fictitious act of violence on that day based on the past violence. That's not what the case law allows.

And the State is asking -- unless they are saying that the testimony will be different at trial, we are asking for the Court to prevent them from saying anything about this during opening statements, because they will know based on the Court's ruling, what your client has already said to Drs. Werner and Harper does not admit self-defense evidence into this case.

So that's what we're looking for, is that ruling; if this is what the testimony is at trial, then self-defense is not going to apply. And all the ancillary prejudicial things that come with it -- reputation evidence, past instances of violence, battered spouse evidence -- is not coming in either.

Now, if they make some statements and promises that they cannot fulfill in opening statements, then that'll be on them. King vs. State will allow us to point those things out to the jury and it will not be burden shifting, but that's what we're asking. This is a proffer. Just like any other proffered testimony, like a sex crimes case where we file a deposition of a Williams Rule victim and ask the Court to rule prior to trial, Hey, if this is how the Williams Rule victim testifies and it's clear and convincing and it meets all the standards under 404 and 403, can this prior act of sexual violence come in during the trial? This is what parties do all the time, is get pretrial rulings on crucial matters like this.

This is a crucial matter because the tip of the iceberg is the second degree murder. The rest of the iceberg, the 99 percent of what has been going on for the last month and a half, is the self-defense that just isn't there. It wasn't there under her former statements to the police and it's not there under her current statements.

So we're asking for a ruling, a motion in limine, which is subject to change based on the evidence at trial. But if this is what the evidence is at trial, the Court should not allow any of the battered spouse, any of the prior violence, any reputation evidence in. That's all we're asking for.

MR. JAY: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. HENDERSON: Judge, could I respond?

THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. HENDERSON: Yes.

Judge, it is not the responsibility of the defense to present their case at a pretrial hearing, however --

THE COURT: But the problem is, in the State's argument and the case law -- which the case law that's been presented by the defense in your filings are not germane to the issue. We're not addressing jury selection. And the standard of proof and the burden with regard to self-defense, you establish a prima facie case and then the higher standard that the State has to overcome it. There's no dispute as to that.

The issue is the necessary predicate to establish battered spouse. And the State's argument is that due to the lack of an overt act based on what Dr. Harper has relied upon, to wit, the multiple interviews or sessions with Ms. Boone, that element seemingly is lacking. We all know what elements are, right? If it's a negligence case --

THE COURT: -- it's, do you reach causation? In this case, it's the elements based on the jury instructions, are Jorge Torres is dead, she caused the death, and it was done so in a depraved heart [sic] manner. I may have butchered that last element, but those are the elements that need to be established based on the jury instructions. Similarly, with self-defense, the case law talks about the overt act.

THE COURT: And then the flashpoint of the defense's argument is that, the facts which were provided to the expert who, in turn, will testify to battered spouse, that flashpoint, that overt act is lacking.

MR. HENDERSON: It's not, Judge, but I find myself in the position now to disclose what our view of the overt act is.

MR. HENDERSON: That's what this -- this is what this motion has put us into. So it's an exercise of the State to learn our theory or our view of the evidence. Because the overt act is in the physical evidence and the overt act is mentioned to Dr. Harper in the deposition as to the reaction of Ms. Boone by the overt act. And the overt act, I have to tell you, his hand is coming out of the suitcase. That means he's about to get out of the suitcase.

Now, based on history and everything else, she doesn't have to wait to see what's gonna happen when he gets out of the suitcase. It's clear what's going to happen when he gets out of the suitcase. It's followed up by physical evidence. Because there's a picture provided of Mr. Torres' hand that shows a mark on that hand that matches up with the bat. That's the overt act.

It's like a gun, okay? You don't have to wait for them to pull the trigger. You don't. And it's base d on all the evidence in the case, just not testimony, but also physical evidence that might support the testimony.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

All right. The Court has had the opportunity to review the motions, review all the case law. The State's motion is going to be granted in part and denied in part. With regard to the State's request to exclude battered spouse syndrome evidence outright, the motion is denied.

As to specifically Wagner, for the reasons identified in the Court's prior rulings as to the concept of argument [sic], again, there's no outright evidence of accident. Not argument, excuse me.

As to the State's reliance on Lantz, L-a-n-t-Z, v. State, 263 So.3d 279, no argument of self-defense was ever offered in that case. I find the cases of Reed v. State, 213 So.3d 1110, Rudin, R-u-d-i-n, v. State, 182 So.3d 724, State v. Woodson, 349 So.3d 510, and Morris, 325 So.3d 1009, distinguishable as all of those cases were traveling under 776.032 for stand your ground hearings.

It's undisputable that an overt act needs to be provided under the Holland case by the Florida Supreme Court, 916 So.2d 750. I find the departure from the essential requirements of law argument by the State factually and legally distinguishable as there was a specific statute for the State obtaining medical records as relied upon in Roberts v. State by the Sixth DCA in May of 2023, 2023 WL 3262633 at pinpoint cite 2. So for those reasons, the State outright motion to preclude or exclude battered spouse syndrome evidence in toto is denied.

With regard to the second portion, that excluding mention of battered spouse syndrome evidence until there's a basis for it, the Court is going to rely on Ladd and Medina; specifically, that there needs to be testimony provided for the expert to testify to the battered spouse syndrome and there needs to be sufficient predicate established for that self-defense. So I'm going to preclude any mention or testimony in the form of expert testimony as to battered spouse until that necessary predicate as identified in Ladd, 564 So.2d 587, has been established.

Any questions with regard to the State's [sic] ruling?

MR. OWENS: The Court's ruling?

THE COURT: I'm sorry, the Court's ruling. Forgive me.

MR. JAY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense?

THE COURT: If you want to mention it in opening, you can mention it in opening. Certainly, I'm going to allow you -- and the State at this point has no problem with the concept of battered spouse being addressed in voir dire. And even if the State objected to it, I most likely would overrule it based on the litany of case law that you've cited that you're allowed to dive into those things during jury selection.

THE COURT: As to should the defense put ona case, the predicate under Ladd needs to be established before any expert opines to battered spouse.

MR. HENDERSON: My concern is opening. Can it be mentioned in opening?

THE COURT: Yes. That's your decision.

THE COURT: That is your decision if you want to mention it in opening. There's no preclusion from you doing that.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions with regard to the Court's order on that matter, State?

MR. JAY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense?

MR. HENDERSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Moving now to the Defendant's Motion in Limine filed October 6th and the State's response to same. It looks like we've reached some level of common ground with regard to that motion. The Court is going to grant the motion with regard to the statements on page 69 through 71 of the transcript of the February 25, 2020 interview between Detectives Lowen and Koepsell and Ms. Boone. From page 69, line 6, through page 71, that will be granted due to the State not objecting to same.

That leaves us to the statements on page 53, line 11; 53, line 13, line 14; page 55, line 24; page 56, line 1; and page 92, line 15.

With that, defense, you may proceed with any argument. Similar to the last motions, I have reviewed all of you-all's case law.

MR. OWENS: Judge, I believe there's some State witnesses here. We would like to invoke the rule.

MR. JAY: The rule of sequestration applies to testimony of other witnesses, not to anything else.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. OWENS: Is there going to be testimony?

MR. JAY: Not from the State.

MR. OWENS: You've got State witnesses here, do you not?

MR. JAY: She's allowed to be here to watch.

MR. OWENS: I understand, but I wanted to know whether she's going to testify.

MR. JAY: I said there's no State witnesses.

THE COURT: So that's a no.

You may proceed with any argument, Mr. Owens.

MR. OWENS: Judge, can I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

I have reviewed the 2.8 instruction prior to today. Thank you, Counselor.

MR. OWENS: Well, Judge, the problem is, the state attorney, when they filed their response, they didn't include the highlighted portion that's italicized at the beginning: Police opinions and statements regarding guilt are generally inadmissible and must be redacted from recordings introduced into evidence unless redaction would render the defendant's relevant admissions incomprehensible. If a recorded interview cannot be appropriately redacted, the trial judge must, upon request, give the following limiting instruction immediately before the recorded interview is played for the jury.

That section, which is comments directed to the Court, was not placed, to my understanding, in their response.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other argument?

MR. OWENS: Judge, this was a two-hour interrogation that occurred the day or two after the event, and the day prior to this time or that morning, the detectives uncovered the two videotapes -- the two-minute video that Sarah Boone had recorded and then followed up 11 minutes later with a 22-second video that she recorded and they found on her phone, which, I believe from the interrogation, discloses that Sarah did not remember making those recordings.

But the purpose of law enforcement's position about having her come in was to interrogate her in an attempt to get a confession from her to the murder. They spent two hours trying to do that any which way they possibly could. And the law says that they're allowed to use -- and I cited several cases. I cited the Smith v. State case, Odeh, O-d-e-h, v. State case, and the Eugene v. State. And in those cases --

THE COURT: I didn't see a citation to Eugene. I mean, Eugene is included in Odeh, but I don't --

MR. OWENS: Eugene is found -- do you need the cite?

THE COURT: I have it. It's included in Odeh, but you did not cite it in your motion.

MR. OWENS: Okay. Eugene is 53 So.3d 1104.

But law enforcement are entitled to use a variety of interrogation techniques to try to elicit a confession to the crime, but as in that case, in spite of the detective's efforts, Sarah Boone refused to admit that she was guilty of the murder.

But as a last resort, Judge -- and it was a two-hour interrogation. It was the last portion -- at least the last quarter, it may have been less than that -- is when the detectives made some statements that are highly prejudicial to the defendant and tend to be opinion and tend to invade the province of the jury. And that's why this Special Jury Instruction, 2.8, Recorded Interview, Effect of Law Enforcement Statements on the Defendant, has that italicized portion in there.

And the statements we're referring to, under my motion, the second section of evidence to be excluded, page 53, line 11: Well, he's dead as a result of your actions. And then paragraph 9, line 13: He's dead as a result of your actions. She responded, line 14: I understand that. And then paragraph 11, page 55, line 24: I -- I -- I have one last question. I just -- I mean, you realize you're the person that killed him, right? Sarah responds -- Sarah Boone responds on page 56: I thought about that. And then, lastly, on page 92: Well, intention or not -- here's the detective distinguishing how he interprets the law and her culpability -- well, intentional [sic] or not, Jorge is dead, and you act like, when you say unintentionally, that absolves you from everything.

That is exactly the kind of opinion testimony from law enforcement that the courts are worried about. The probative value of that type opinion testimony about her guilt is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. JAY: The State stands by the case law it cited and the jury instruction that would be read. I didn't feel it necessary to include italicized portions of comments to the Court because this is what would get read to the jury. Those statements are designed to get responses from her. They did get responses from her.

THE COURT: Let me ask this question first, Mr. Jay. Do you disagree with counsel's representation of what is reflected in the Q&A at that point in time?

MR. JAY: To the extent that he is making the argument that they're expressing an opinion about the law?

THE COURT: No, no, no. The words. Not his opinion, not his thoughts or what it means, but the black and white verbiage as reflected in the motion, is that what's reflected in the recording?

MR. JAY: I'm accepting that he would not misrepresent that to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

You may continue.

MR. JAY: And as far as the last line on page 92, line 15, if something is designed to get a response that a normal person would respond to and there's no response, that still makes it a relevant statement. He's not giving an opinion on the law, he's giving an opinion about her reactions to this interview and trying to get a reaction from her when he says: Well, intention or not, Jorge is dead. You act like, when you say unintentionally, that absolves you from everything.

He's not stating that that is a legal defense, he's just commenting on what has transpired in the 92 pages of the interview. So we defer to whatever the Court's ruling is.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Any rebuttal?

MR. OWENS: Just for the state attorney not to put that in there, the italicized portion where the Supreme Court is giving instructions to the Court with those comments, for them not to put that in there, I disagree with.

THE COURT: Well, the Jackson case speaks for itself. The Court has reviewed it.

MR. OWENS: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I thank you both for your motion -- your motions, your responses, and the case law. The Court is going to grant the defense's motion. I disagree with the defense -- or with the State, rather, as identified in their response that the only issue is battered spouse. The issue is, one of the elements is cause, and those three statements go specifically, I believe, to opinions as to the cause of Mr. Torres' death.

So the Court is going to grant the State's [sic] motion as under the Bush case cited by the State, law enforcement's opinions are inadmissible due to the prejudicial effect that they may have. And I do find that this is an expression of law enforcement's opinions as to the guilt of the accused. As such, the motion is granted and those will need to be redacted from --

MR. BECK: The Court indicated a State motion. It's a defense motion.

THE COURT: I apologize. Thank you. The defense's motion is granted for those reasons.

Any questions or clarifications with regard to the Court's ruling, State? Questions or clarifications with regards to the Court's ruling?

MR. JAY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Questions or clarifications with regard to the State's [sic] ruling?

MR. OWENS: No, sir.

THE COURT: Or the Court's ruling. Excuse me.

MR. OWENS: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right. That takes us now to the State's Objection and Motion in Limine to Exclude Decedent's Medical Records. I've reviewed that as well. State, you may proceed.

MR. JAY: Judge, just the other night, I received 550 pages of medical records regarding the treatment of Mr. Torres from two incidents, one in 2017 and one in 2018. A third e-mail that I received from Mr. Owens purported -- he believed that they had attachments. They did not. I replied to him as such and I have not gotten any additional e-mails with attachments regarding the medical records. So for the purposes of this hearing, all I'm arguing about is the 550 pages that I have been provided.

One of those instances involved a narrative being given by the patient, Mr. Torres, that he had put his hand through a plate glass window.

THE COURT: This is the 2018 incident, correct?

MR. JAY: And his wife the following day made him go in and get treatment. There was a 4.5-centimeter laceration that required two sutures. There is no history in the narrative about any violence that the decedent had committed. So I anticipate that Ms. Boone, when she testifies, will give us an explanation about how this was an instance of past violence that she was aware of by the decedent.

So making that assumption, then what the State is asking for is, the 57 pages seems excessive. This jury is going to have a lot of information to weigh and consider. They don't -- not every page of these 57 pages is relevant.

What is relevant is, yes, he came in for treatment. That narrative, you know, and the history that he gave of putting his hand through a plate glass window and that he got sutures, that corroborates her testimony. I understand why she will need corroboration for her testimony, to bolster her credibility. So if she testifies that way, we get it, but it's just excessive and it's going to be confusing. They don't need to read 57 pages of all of his treatment.

The second batch was 487 pages regarding an incident on Christmas of 2017, when what the decedent reports in the narrative to the hospital is that some unknown men jumped him and beat him up. Being a victim of violence is not relevant in this case.

I expect there will be a story, based upon the testimony that we've taken from the experts, that this all happened at a family gathering and one of the decedent's brothers learned from Sarah Boone that Sarah Boone said that he had -- he, the decedent -- had committed violence against her and then beat him up. That's not the same ilk as corroborating violence with breaking windows or whatever it is that caused his laceration, whatever she ends up testifying to about the 2018 incident.

But this incident, it's irrelevant that he got beat up by his brother. It's irrelevant that he suffered the amount and severity of injuries that he did. That is not required to corroborate her testimony that -- I mean, I don't even know if it comes in that she makes an out-of-court statement to the decedent's brother that something is true that happened in the past. That seems like classic hearsay. I'm not sure how she would get that in. I don't know that the 487 pages is needed to corroborate that.

And if the Court -- like I stated in my response, if the Court believes that it is necessary to corroborate her story that he did get beat up by his brother, then, again, there are narrative parts of these medical records -- generally, I would say in this particular instance, it was a handful of pages -- that give the narrative as to what happened. And I don't know that it's relevant what the treatment was that he received, but there's narratives of that as well.

They don't need to be bogged down with 487 pages of toxicology reports, nursing rounds, just all the things that I'm sure the Court is familiar with from your past experience that are in these medical records. It's unnecessary and it's prejudicial. Its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudice, confusing, repetitiveness as I outlined in my response. So that's our position.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Response?

MR. OWENS: Judge, as you know, we got on this case about 45 days ago and there's I can't tell you how many pages of discovery there is that we've had to go through. And two or three weeks ago, the state attorney provided us over 500 pages from either telephone calls that my client was involved in from the jail or tablet communications, which are kind of like e-mails or text messages, and that hasn't been narrowed down, but that was given to us. So that's something else we had to stop and go through 500 -- over 500 pages, and they haven't narrowed that down to which ones they believe are incriminating to her, okay?

THE COURT: Understood, but respectfully, that's not the issue before the Court right now.

MR. OWENS: I understand that, but, yes, the medical records are going to be narrowed down. And, yes, we would have to make some tie to Sarah Boone's testimony to whether or not the medical records of the decedent, Jorge Torres, are admissible to corroborate her stories about the incidences of violence and whether they match up. But, yes, I agree there's going to be a narrowing down, but it's kind of premature about that. They've got several volumes. I assume before they introduce something, they're going to have to narrow it down.

Did you-all not have Jorge Torres' medical records prior to me sending them to you?

MR. JAY: No. No, we didn't.

MR. OWENS: All right. Well, we took the deposition of Dr. Harper and, as you know, Judge, these forensic psychologists, when they're trying to make an opinion as to battered spouse or whatever the case may be, they rely on their assessment involving the personal contact and interviews they have with the client, but a lot of it is any other collateral evidence that tends to support it. That involves arrest reports, that involves court records, that involves psychological notes, that involves medical records. And at that time, when the State took Dr. Harper, our witness' deposition, she said, Yes, I did rely on Dr. -- or Jorge Torres' medical records, so they were well aware.

THE COURT: That doesn't mean they come into evidence.

MR. OWENS: I know that. I didn't say that, but they were well aware that that's one thing that she relied upon. A lot of that collateral evidence doesn't come in, too, and it's gonna be --

THE COURT: I need to jump into the breach here. IT understand all of that. I understand that there's been volumes of documents that have been provided between both parties and I understand, based on my review of Dr. -- of the highlighted portions that the State pointed out in their motion as to what Dr. Harper relied upon. None of that is germane to the State's argument.

And you've admitted that there needs to be a narrowing down, so let's just kind of compartmentalize what we've got here.

MR. OWENS: Yeah, so it's premature. It's premature. I agree it needs to be narrowed down. And then based on Sarah Boone's testimony --

THE COURT: You are the proponent of the evidence.

THE COURT: So you have to establish relevance.

MR. OWENS: I agree.

THE COURT: And you have to establish that it is not so substantially unfairly prejudicial.

THE COURT: That the prejudice does not outweigh its probative value, including, but not limited to, the other identifications in 90.403.

MR. OWENS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So my question is, sir, with regard to the 2018 incident of the fist through the plate glass window -- and I can't recall, 40-some-odd pages I think the State identified as that -- what of those 47 pages is germane to an incident of violence that may be needed to establish the self-defense concept of those 47 pages?

MR. OWENS: It will be -- it will be relevant after she testifies about that incident.

THE COURT: All 47 pages?

MR. OWENS: Maybe not all 47 pages. I've agreed that some of it needs to be narrowed down.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what of it needs to be narrowed down, since we have some level of common ground here.

MR. OWENS: My case is not going to be presented, I would assume, until next week, so I've got a little bit of time. I'll let the State know.

THE COURT: That's not how this works.

MR. OWENS: Okay. I can't let you know today, Judge. I'll narrow it down or we'll talk in the next couple of days.

THE COURT: Well, the State's position is that the narrative should be permitted as to the 2018 incident, the why Mr. Torres was there, but the nursing rounds, the charts, the follow-ups, treatment, anything in the future, other than the 4.5-centimeter laceration that required two sutures. I understand the narrative as to what transpired. What else is relevant?

And I haven't seen these 47 pages, so I'm not sure. I'm relying on counsel's representation.

MR. OWENS: Okay. I don't know. I'd have to look at them, but in one of the medical records, Jorge Torres was over a .31 BAC. Every time --

THE COURT: In 2018?

THE COURT: Because I'm talking about the 2018 incident --

THE COURT: -- with regard to the plate glass window.

MR. OWENS: I'd have to look at the records, but there is other evidence in those records that's going to be relevant after she testifies. That's when she gets beaten, when he gets really drunk, or that's when he does something violent or threatens to do something violent when he gets really drunk. In one of those incidences, he was over a .3. When he gets over a .2 to .3, that's when he gets angry. He's fine up until that point. We're going to establish that. I don't want to put on my defense today, but, Judge, there is gonna be relevance to more than just the narrative of those medical records. I'll narrow it down by Friday. That's the best I can do.

THE COURT: Okay. What about the 2017 incident, 487 pages, and those documents pertaining to the facial reconstruction and anything thereafter? What does that have to do with anything?

MR. OWENS: Same thing. You know, it's gonna be -- it's gonna be based on her testimony and then the judge is going to have to make a decision about whether that's admissible based on her testimony about what happened.

THE COURT: But what does the facial reconstruction surgery, pre-surgery, post-surgery notes have anything to do with whether or not that incident actually took place?

MR. OWENS: That's gonna depend on Sarah Boone, depending on what her testimony is, and you'll have to find based on that whether or not that's relevant and probative to the case.

THE COURT: That's not how motions in limine work.

MR. OWENS: I don't know what else to tell you, Judge. She's gonna have to testify and then we'll make the arguments as to the admissibility of that.

THE COURT: I'm struggling with understanding how -- I can understand BAC results. I can understand that based on Dr. Harper's deposition. I can understand the narrative as to why they were there.

I don't know what are all in these records. What does nursing rounds or pre-op/post-op of facial reconstruction surgery have anything to do with an incident that purportedly took place on December 24th, 2017? How is it relevant?

MR. OWENS: Some of those may not be. Some of the records may be relevant, depending on Sarah Boone's testimony about how what happened to him was tied to what he did to her.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. OWENS: That's it.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. JAY: The two parties' discovery responsibilities in a criminal matter are not equal. The State of Florida has a duty to disclose anything that anybody knows or may reasonably be calculated to lead to relevant information to the defense. The defendant's obligation is to let us know what they're going to use in trial. So for them to come in today on the third day of jury selection and to tell us that it's premature to ask for what is going to be their actual evidence in atrial is wrong. They got these records -- and I understand that they're the ninth set of attorneys for Ms. Boone, but the defendant got these records in 2022 or 2021, and they just get disclosed to me overnight a couple of nights ago.

In their discovery responses, in the first amendment, second amendment, third, so on and so forth, for weeks they were telling us that they didn't have them and they were waiting for them, but they were sitting in Ms. Boone's box apparently that Billy Lane had acquired years ago. So it's not premature to ask. And it's not unfair to ask for what is going to be introduced in this case or attempted to be introduced, particularly given the Court's rulings.

We had rulings from this Court, I think you entered it August 5th or August 6th, setting forth a schedule for, what are you both -- and the State too. We both disclosed, what are we actually introducing? And the State has actually narrowed down the digital phone evidence from the defendant greatly to about 160 pages of the PDF from the thousands that it was and a handful -- a few dozen pictures and videos. We have done everything we can to narrow it down. We're not asking for much here. We're not asking for much.

And just to bring the point about the BAC. Jorge Torres had a .342 medical blood, so there's probably some conversion, 10, 15 percent for legal blood, at the time that he was admitted for his facial injuries. That would be a different picture than on the date of the plate glass window.

On that date, again, I expect that the testimony from the defendant will be that he was the aggressor, the violent one, and his blood alcohol level would be relevant for the plate glass window one, but I'm struggling to understand what his BAC's relevance is if we're all at a family gathering at the Torreses and she says something that triggers one of his brothers to violently beat him nearly to death, what his BAC's relevance is on that particular occasion, unless her testimony is the decedent was being violent with her that day, and that's just not my understanding of how the deposition is read.

So, Judge, we're not asking for much. I don't think Friday is sufficient. We're attaching jeopardy to this case as soon as we swear this panel in hopefully tomorrow morning.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. The Court has reviewed the motion and has reviewed both the arguments. I'm struggling with a relevance on some of these things. So I'm going to grant the State's motion in part to the factual narratives as to why Mr. Torres was seeking treatment. That will be admissible. I'm going to overrule the State's objection with that, and I think they've conceded that that is relevant.

Information regarding blood alcohol content in both the December 24, 2017 incident and the 2018 incident I find potential relevance, so I'm going to overrule the State's objection with regard to those.

However, the balance, I'm going to sustain the State's objection and grant their motion in limine unless there's evidence provided in the defense's case in chief that make these other documents relevant. Because at this point in time, it is unclear to me how the balance of other hospital records, nursing rounds, pre-op, post-op, the surgery itself from the 2017 incident are relevant to a fact of consequence, be it any of the material allegations the State needs to establish or any material allegations the defense needs to establish for the purposes of self-defense.

THE COURT: I'm not foreclosing you, but there needs to be something for you to link these documents together for me.

MR. OWENS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Any clarification or questions with regard to the State's --

MR. JAY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- or the Court's ruling?

MR. JAY: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Defense?

MR. OWENS: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

That now takes us to the objections to the evidence. We have Defendant's Objections to State's Digital Exhibits filed October 15th, the State's Amended -- or State's -- excuse me, State's Response to Defendant's Fifth Amended Reciprocal Discovery Exhibit List filed also on October 15th.

I have reviewed these. I'm a little bit of a loss in the State's response because I don't know what items 1, 2, et cetera, are. It just identifies them. I'm not sure what it is that they are.

MR. JAY: It's tracking their Fifth Amended Exhibit List. As I pointed out before, it got really confusing, because as they added things, it would not go to the end of the list, it would get put into the middle of the list. So I started over, scrapped my first response to the first amended one, scrapped my second response to the second amended one, both of which were filed on September 27th in a timely manner. And this is why my paragraphs start with zero in my response, because they have a paragraph 1A and then they list the items, and I wanted to make it very easy and clear for the Court to just be able to flip to what paragraph I'm talking about for each item, tracking their Fifth Amended Exhibit List.

THE COURT: But here's the problem that I'm having. On September 27th, I see the Notice of Provision of Defendant's Third Amended Exhibit List. When was the Fifth Amended Exhibit List provided?

MR. JAY: That might be a problem with them not filing things with the Clerk of the Court.

MR. JAY: I'm getting copies of some pleadings, but they are not Bates stamped with the Clerk of the Court's e-filing system on the top left, so I am not certain that they have filed anything with the Clerk of the Court.

THE COURT: Here's the other problem that I have. All I have -- all I see on my end is the notice of providing. It doesn't identify anything. It's a one-page document, so it's hard for me to say what -- I know you may have seen it, but the Court hasn't seen it based on what's been filed.

MR. JAY: That's a -- I believe I would direct any questions about why that's not filed with the Clerk of the Court to the defense.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I need clarification, Mr. Owens, as to when the Fifth Amended Reciprocal Discovery Exhibit List was filed and what is in it. Because the notice that I see in the court file from September 27th is just a notice. It doesn't identify anything for me to line up item 1 and item 1 as to what they purport to be.

MR. OWENS: You're asking for when it was filed? We're checking on that, when it was filed. What was the next question?

THE COURT: All I have is a notice. So on September 27th, there was a Notice of Provision of Defendant's Third Amended Exhibit List, and it's just that, what we intend on utilizing has been provided, but I don't have anything else as to what those items are.

MR. OWENS: Okay. Did you want us to provide you with a copy of those to your JA?

THE COURT: Or you can send it to Madam Clerk and she can print it out to me, because I'm having difficulty lining up what these things are, because all I have in the court file is, this was sent on this day, but I don't know what any of these things are.

MR. OWENS: All right. If we can move on to something else and let me get her --

THE COURT: Unless we've got some housekeeping matters to address for this afternoon, but unless I'm missing something, the only other thing that we've got teed up to address this morning is the objections.

MR. OWENS: I've got a couple things.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- give me one second.

All right. I got an e-mail this morning from Jury Services. Juror No. 551, I don't recall from what panel -- no, I'm sorry, Juror No. 471, Panel 3, Seat 48, tested positive for COVID and Jury Services has instructed him not to return.

Juror No. 551 --

MR. OWENS: Who was the first one?

THE COURT: Sure.

Juror No. 471, Panel 3, that would have been yesterday morning, Seat 48, advised Jury Services this morning that he was not feeling well. After leaving the courthouse, he tested positive for COVID. I have instructed Jury Services to excuse him because we don't need that floating around.

MR. OWENS: For cause.

THE COURT: The other juror, 551, I don't have any other information as to what panel or seat, she took a COVID test and it was negative. She is planning on reporting today.

So due to the shrinking from 54 to 53, jury selection will take place here in 12-Alpha this afternoon as opposed to the 23rd floor. The deputies have already brought in additional chairs so that we can fit 53 people in here.

That's the only other housekeeping matters that I have to address. So are there any housekeeping matters to address from the State before we address the objections issues?

MR. JAY: Is it wise to not utilize that expanded space when two of these panels -- or at least one of these panels has already been exposed to COVID up in the 23rd floor?

MR. OWENS: I'm sorry, say that again.

MR. JAY: Would it not be wise to use the bigger space in 23 since one of our panels has already potentially been exposed to COVID, as opposed to packing everybody in like sardines?

THE COURT: Response?

MR. OWENS: I don't know the layout of 23, so...

THE COURT: Can you-all approach just for a second?

Continue to next page2.Juror 551 Illness, COVID Concerns, Courtroom Space and Seating, and Exhibit-List Submission